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in a requirement of proving secondary 
meaning. Emphasizing that protection 
would be given initially only if the 
trade dress were inherently distinctive 
and capable of identifying the source 
of the product, the Court noted that the 
termination of protection would occur 
merely because the business was not 
successful enough in the market. Id 
Denying protection to a unique trade 
dress for this reason was unacceptable 
to the Court, which opined that a busi-
ness in this situation should be afa 
forded protection of its unique trade 
dress while it enhances its recognition 
in the market. Id. 
Rejecting the attempted distinction 
between trade dress and trademarks, 
the Court stated that there is no persua-
sive reason to apply different analyses 
to the two. The Second Circuit al-
lowed protection for suggestive, inher-
ently distinctive trademarks, without 
proof of secondary meaning, but de-
nied protection to trade dress without 
such proof. Id. (citing Thompson 
Medical Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 
208 (2d Cir. 1985». Recognizingthat 
proof of secondary meaning would not 
be required if trademarks were inher-
ently distinctive, the Fifth Circuit held, 
contrary to the Second Circuit, that 
such a rule should also apply to trade 
dress. Id. at 2760 (citing Chevron 
Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchas-
ing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 
(5th Cir. 1981». Agreeing with the 
Fifth Circuit, the Court further empha-
sized that protection of trademarks and 
trade dress serves the same end, which 
is to prevent deception and unfair com-
petition. Id. at 2760. Moreover, the 
Court noted that section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act does not mention either 
trademark or trade dress, and it also 
does not mention secondary meaning. 
Although section 1052 of the Lanham 
Act mentions secondary meaning, the 
Court pointed out that the section only 
applies to descriptive marks, not to 
inherently distinct trade dress. Id. at 
2760. 
In further support of its holding that 
secondary meaning was not required, 
the Court expressed concern that a 
secondary meaning requirement for 
inherently distinct trade dress would 
undermine the purpose of the Lanham 
Act. Id. The Court noted that the 
primary purpose of the Lanham Act is 
to protect the goodwill established by 
the owner of a unique trademark and 
the ability of customers to distinguish 
among competing businesses. Id. 
Trademarks also enhance competition 
and quality by securing to businesses 
the benefits of a good reputation. Id. 
(citing Park W Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 
andFly,/nc.,469U.S.189,198(1985». 
Requiring proof of secondary meaning 
would deny businesses the security of 
knowing their trade dress was pro-
tected while they improved their mar-
ket standing. Id. 
The Court also rejected the conten-
tion that a business which used a cer-
tain design first would preclude com-
petition by products of similar design. 
Clarifying the status of the law, the 
Court stated that only nonfunctional, 
distinctive trade dress would be pro-
tected by section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act. Id. A functional design that is 
only one of a few options for competi-
tors would not be protected, because it 
would hinder free competition. Id. 
However, the Court emphasized that if 
secondary meaning was required, com-
petition could be unduly burdened, 
particularly for small businesses. Such 
a requirement would have allowed a 
competitor the opportunity to use the 
trade dress of the original business in 
new markets, thereby hindering the 
originator's ability to expand. Id. at 
2761. 
In holding that secondary meaning 
is not a required element of protection 
for inherently distinctive trade dress, 
the Two Pesos decision will protect 
small business owners who have cre-
ated a unique image to distinguish 
their business from all others and will 
guard against replication before the 
business is able to establish an associa-
tion between the trade dress and its 
business in the market. Consequently, 
competitors will not be permitted to 
create a business with an atmosphere 
and appearance similar to an existing 
business on the basis that the trade 
dress of the original business has not 
yet established a secondary meaning. 
- Susan L. Oliveri 
Banks v. State: STATEMENTS 
MADE BY VICTIM EXPRESSING 
FEAR OF KILLER NOT ADMIS-
SIBLE TO REBUT EVIDENCE OF 
BA TTERED SPOUSE SYN-
DROME. 
In Banks v. State, 92 Md. App. 422, 
608 A.2d 1249 (1992), the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland held that 
statements made by a victim prior to 
his death expressing fear of his killer 
were inadmissible to rebut evidence of 
the battered spouse syndrome. The 
court found that the statements at issue 
were hearsay and did not fit into any of 
the hearsay exceptions. 
In the early evening hours of Au-
gust 14, 1990, Thelma Jean Banks 
("Banks") called the Baltimore City 
Police and reported that her boyfriend, 
James McDonald ("McDonald"), had 
been stabbed. When the police ar-
rived, McDonald was dead. Banks 
initially told police that she had been 
upstairs when intruders broke into the 
house and stabbed McDonald, but she 
eventually admitted that she stabbed 
the victim. 
Banks was convicted of second 
degree murder by a jwy in the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City and was sen-
tenced to a term of twenty years in 
prison. At trial, Banks maintained that 
she suffered from battered spouse syn-
drome when she stabbed McDonald. 
In support of this defense, Banks testi-
fied that the victim drank heavily and 
often physically abused her. Five other 
witnesses also testified that the victim 
had abused Banks. 
In an attempt to rebut the evidence 
supporting the battered spouse syn-
drome defense, the state offered the 
victim's mother and sister who testi-
fied that McDonald told them he was 
afraid of Banks because she physically 
abused him. Lucille McDonald, the 
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victim's mother, testified that on the 
day before the stabbing, McDonald 
telephoned her and told her that Banks 
was trying to attack him with a "sickle." 
The victim's sister, Ilene Muse, testi-
fied that on the day of the stabbing, 
McDonald told her that he wanted to 
move out of the house because he was 
tired of arguing with Banks. Addition-
ally, two police officers testified that 
they had previously investigated re-
ports of domestic disputes at the home. 
Officer Braxton testified that on three 
occasions, the victim stated to him that 
he had been assaulted by Banks. Offi-
cer Carter testified that each time he 
responded to complaints at the Banks' 
home, McDonald told him they were 
arguing and that he was trying to leave 
the house to avoid a fight. 
The trial court admitted all of the 
statements over objection, finding that 
the statements were ''verbal acts" and 
thus, not inadmissible hearsay. The 
trial court explained that the state-
ments were not admitted for their truth 
as to whether Banks attacked the vic-
tim, but rather to show McDonald's 
state of mind and his fear of Banks. 
Banks appealed to the Court ofSpe-
cial Appeals of Maryland and argued 
that the alleged statements were irrel-
evant and inadmissible hearsay. The 
state insisted the statements were prop-
erly admitted and relied on three alter-
native theories to support the holding 
ofthe trial court. 
The Court of Special Appeals began 
its analysis by determining whether 
the statements were verbal acts. Id. at 
432,608 A.2d at 1254. The court de-
fined verbal acts as "out-of-court state-
ments [that] are operative legal facts 
which constitute the basis of a claim, 
charge, or defense." Id. (quoting Lynn 
McLain, 6 Maryland Evidence § 801.7 
"---at 278 (1987». The court recognized 
that verbal acts are nonbearsay and 
explained that bequest language in a 
will, and language of offer and accep-
tance ina contract are typical examples 
of verbal acts. Banks at 432, 608 A.2d 
at 1254. The court noted that because 
verbal acts take on a legal effect, the 
reliability of the declarant is unimpor-
tant, and only the fact that the state-
ment was made is relevant. Id. 
The state argued that the statements 
were verbal acts because they expressed 
the victim's "fear" and "conflict avoid-
ance." Id The court, however, con-
cluded that the statements were not 
verbal acts. The court explained that 
''fear'' and "conflict avoidance" carry 
no legal significance when establish-
ing the elements of murder or man-
slaughter; more importantly, they carry 
no significance in rebutting evidence 
of battered spouse syndrome or self 
defense. Id The court emphasized that 
if the statements were relevant to the 
state's case, the truth of the statements 
must have been relevant since the state 
was trying to prove that Banks had 
abused the victim in the past. Id. at 
433-34, 608 A.2d at 1255. Conse-
quently, the court determined that the 
statements were not verbal acts be-
cause their relevance depended on their 
truth. Id. 
Next, the state argued the state-
ments were not hearsay because they 
were not being offered for their truth, 
but rather to show the victim's state of 
mind when he was stabbed. Id. at 434, 
608 A.2d at 1255. In rejecting this 
argument, the court cited several cases 
which have recognized that even if 
statements are not offered for their 
truth, they still must be relevant and 
not unduly prejudicial. Id. at 435,608 
A.2d at 1255-56. The court empha-
sized that only Banks's state of mind 
was relevant to the commission of the 
crime, notthe victim's. Id. at435, 608 
A.2d at 1255-56. Furthermore, the 
probative value ofthe victim's state of 
mind was outweighed by the extremely 
prejudicial nature of the evidence on 
the jury. Id at 435, 608 A.2d at 1256. 
Finally, the state argued that 
McDonald's mother's statements were 
admissible under the present sense 
impression exception to the hearsay 
rule. Id. at436, 608 A.2d at 1256. The 
exception, codified in the Federal Rules 
of Evidence and adopted by Maryland 
in Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 508 
A.2d 97 6 (1986), provides that "a state-
ment describing or explaining an event 
or condition made while the declarant 
was perceiving the event or condition, 
or immediately thereafter" is not ex-
cluded by the hearsay rule. Banks, 92 
Md App. at 436, 608 A.2d at 1256. 
In Booth, a witness telephoned the 
victim on the day of his murder. The 
victim stated to the witness that he was 
going to ask his company, a woman 
named Brenda, to leave. The witness 
then heard the victim's door open and 
the witness asked the victim who was 
there. The victim replied that Brenda 
was talking to someone behind the 
door. ld. (citing Booth, 306 Md. at 
316, 508 A.2d at 976). The Booth 
court allowed the statement into evi-
dence as a present sense impression, 
explaining that in order to fall within 
the exception, the time interval be-
tween the declarant's observation and 
utterance must be very short. [d. Fur-
thermore, if in considering the sur-
rounding circumstances there was suf-
ficient time to permit reflection, then 
the statement will not fall within the 
exception. Id. 
The state argued that the victim's 
statement to his mother was similar to 
that made in Booth, and therefore, fell 
within the present sense exception to 
the hearsay rule. The court, however, 
noted several differences between 
Booth and the present case. Id. at 437, 
608 A.2d at 1256. The Booth court 
found the contested statement reliable 
because there was no reason for the 
victim to lie about someone being at 
the door. Id. (citing Booth, 306 Md. at 
317,508 A.2d at 976). However, the 
court distinguished Booth because in 
the instant case, the victim's alcohol 
problem, frequent fights with appel-
lant, and the fact that the witness was 
the victim's mother, all supplied po-
tential reasons for the victim to lie. 
Banks, 92 Md. App. at 437, 608 A.2d 
at 1256. Furthermore the court rea-
soned that nothing in this case indi-
cated that a short period' of time ex-
isted between the victim's observance 
of the event in question and his utter-
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ance pertaining to it. Accordingly, the 
court rejected the State's argument 
concerning the mother's statements and 
similarly rejected application of the 
present sense impression excep .! .. (0 
the other three out-of-court statements 
made to the victim's sister and to the 
police officers. 
The court of special appeals thus 
rejected each ofthe state's theories on 
admitting out-of-court statements made 
by a victim about his killer to rebut the 
battered spouse syndrome defense. 
Moreover, the highly prejudicial na-
ture of the statements contributed to 
the court's conclusion. Overall, the 
opinion may be helpful to defense at-
torneys who raise the defense of bat-
tered spouse syndrome, self-defense, 
or hot-blooded provocation and must 
prevent the state from admitting out-
of -court statements of the victims in 
rebuttal to such defenses. Most impor-
tantly, however, the opinion clarified 
the hearsay rules regarding verbal acts, 
state of mind, and present sense im-
pression, and thus, sought to prevent 
their misuse by practioners and trial 
judges in the future. 
- Heather L. Ashbury 
Morgan v. Illinois: TRIAL 
COURT'S REFUSAL TO IN-
QUIRE WHETHER A POTEN-
TIAL JUROR WOULD AUTO-
MA TICALL Y IMPOSE THE 
DEATH PENALTY UPON CON-
VICTION WAS INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT. 
In Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 
2222 (1992), the United States Su-
preme Court held that during voir dire 
in a capital offense case a defendant is 
entitled to challenge for cause and have 
removed a juror who would automati-
cally impose the death penalty, irre-
spective of the facts of the case or the 
trial court's instructions. In so hold-
ing, the Court proposed a due process 
review standard which requires a trial 
court to question venire panels about 
their position on capital punishment. 
In the state of Illinois, capital of-
fense cases are tried in two phases. The 
same jury may determine both a 
defendant's guilt and the sentence, or 
the defendant may elect to waive sen-
tencing by the jury. Upon conviction 
for a capital offense, a separate sen-
tencing hearing is held to determine if 
aggravating and mitigating factors ex-
isted. A unanimous jury must find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that at least 
lout of 10 aggravating factors were 
present in order to sentence the defen-
dant to death. The defendant is given 
the death penalty if the defendant is 
eligible and the jury unanimously finds 
no mitigating factors. 
In 1990, Derrick Morgan was paid 
$4,000 by an inner-city gang to kill a 
narcotics dealer who was also his friend. 
Morgan lured the victim into an aban-
doned apartment and shot him in the 
head six times. After weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, an Illinois jury convicted the 
petitioner of first degree murder and 
sentenced him to death. 
At trial in the Circuit Court for 
Cook County, State prosecutors in-
voked their rights under Witherspoon 
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), in 
which the United States Supreme Court 
held that a state may excuse for cause 
any venire members whose strong op-
position to the death penalty would 
render them unable to impose death 
regardless ofthe circumstances. Con-
sequently, the trial judge asked those 
eventually empaneled whether any 
would automatically vote against the 
death penalty, irrespective ofthe facts. 
The trial judge denied a similar re-
quest by the defense for a "reverse-
Witherspoon" inquiry, which would 
have asked whether any juror would 
automatically vote to impose the death 
penalty regardless of the facts. Be-
cause the trial judge asked questions 
concerning the jurors fairness and im-
partiality during voir dire, the court 
found thatthe voir dire was ofthe same 
general nature as the "reverse-
Witherspoon" inquiry. Morgan, 112 S. 
Ct. at 2226. 
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed 
and held that the "reverse-Witherspoon" 
inquiry was not constitutionally re-
quired. It also found the Morgan jury 
fair and impartial because each juror 
had sworn to uphold the law and none 
expressed partial views. The United 
States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to decide whether, during voir dire 
for a capital offense, the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires a trial court to refuse to ask 
whether a potential juror would auto-
matically impose the death penalty 
upon conviction. 
The Court first confirmed the im-
partiality requirement imposed upon a 
jury during the sentencing phase of a 
capital offense case. [d. at 2228. The 
Court invoked its decision in Turnerv. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965), in 
which the Supreme Court held that the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause required impartiality to the same 
extent required underthe Sixth Amend-
ment of any jury empaneled to decide 
a case. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229. 
Next, the Court determined, in ac-
cordance with the holding in Wain-
wright v. Witt. 469 U.S. 412 (1985), 
that when a juror's views on capital 
punishment would impair the perfor-
mance of her duty to follow instruc-
tions, such a juror is not impartial and 
must be removed for cause. Morgan. 
112 S. Ct. at 2229. In support of its 
conclusion, the Court cited its decision 
in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 
(1988), in which a juror who would 
have automatically voted for the death 
penalty was removed by preemptory 
challenge. The Court determined that 
the failure to remove the juror forcause 
was error under the standard set forth 
in Witt. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229. 
The Court next addressed whether 
a trial court must inquire into a juror's 
views on capital punishment upon a 
defendant's request. Voir dire, the 
Court stated, is a critical method of 
effectuating the criminal defendant's 
right to an impartial jury. [d. at 2230. 
Only with the proper voir dire can a 
trial judge fulfill the responsibility of 
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